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PropertyInstitutionsand Economic Development:
Some EmpiricalTests*

Frederic L. Pryor
SwarthmoreCollege
Ante lovem nulli subigebantarva coloni; ne signarequidem
aut partirilimite campum fas erat: in medium quaerebant,
ipsaque tellus omnia liberius, nullo poscente, ferebat.
[VIRGIL]'

A. Introduction
The purpose of this essay is to examine quantitatively some factors influencing the origin, development, and continued existence of particular
property institutions in 100 different economies and to test a number of
hypotheses concerning such matters that are derived from simple deductive
models.
Property relations offer a rich field for exploration by comparative
economists, but, unfortunately, analysis of property is usually left to the
historian, jurist, or political scientist. Of course, certain aspects of property
do have political or social elements, but this should not blind us to the
important economic aspects of the institution as well. Some relations
between property institutions and the level of economic development
have been noted-particularly by Marxists-but such analyses have been
neither systematic nor quantitative.
In trying to dissect the effects of the level of economic development
on property institutions, a number of serious problems arise in isolating
* I would like to
express my deep appreciation to Robert Carneiro who supplied
the anthropological data used in this study. Thanks are also due to George Dalton,
Norma Diamond, Victor Novick, Robert C. Mitchell, Zora Pryor, Scott Forman, and
George Stolnitz for their helpful comments on a previous draft of this essay. I
would also like to thank the International Development Research Center of Indiana
University for partial financing of the project.
1 Virgil, Georgicon, bk. 1, lines 120 ff.
Ere [Jove], no peasant vex'd the peaceful ground,
Which only turfs and greens for alters found:
No fences parted fields, nor marks nor bounds
Distinguish'd acres of litigious grounds.
But all was common, and the fruitful earth
Was free to give her unexacted birth.
[Dryden translation]
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modal institutions in complex economies. In this regard, it seems easier to
confine the analysis to small and technologically simple societies; therefore, only precapitalist economies are included in this empirical study.
Much of the discussion of this paper lies on the relatively unexplored
interface between economics and anthropology, and I have felt free to
borrow techniques from both disciplines.
The procedure followed is quite straightforward.In the next section,
I present several simple cost/benefit models and deduce a series of hypotheses. In the following section, I discuss certain statistical problems that
are not usually faced in economic analysis. The hypotheses are put to test
in the fourth section, and the results are summarized and expanded upon
in the final part of the essay.
B. Theoretical Observations
1. Definitions
In order to avoid ambiguity, simple definitions for "property," "property
institutions," and "economic development" as used in this essay are
presented below.
Property is considered as a bundle of recognized relations (rights,
obligations, claims, powers, privileges, or immunities) between people in
regard to some good, service, or "thing" that has economic value. A
number of terms in this definition, especially in regard to "recognition"
and "economic value," give rise to analytical difficulties;2 but, for the
purpose of this essay, the definition appears sufficient.
Property institutionsinclude, not only property rights, but the various
customs and regulations that structure the exercise and the transfer of
such rights. Exercising of particular rights is strongly influenced by the
way in which rights are validated (or the acts by which such rights become
recognized), including contract customs and the specificity with which
rights are defined. The transferring of rights covers not only exchange
procedures but inheritance institutions as well. Propositions in this essay
cover a number of different types of such property institutions.
Since I am dealing with many primitive economies, it is necessary to
give an explicit definition of economic development, especially since the
ranking of these societies according to their relative development level
proved to be the most difficult statistical task of the analysis.
In this essay, I define detelopment according to four criteria relating
to the complexity of the economy: the division of labor, the level of technology, the diversity of production above the barest food necessities, and
the elaborateness of economic organizations. Although some have argued
that these characteristicsare not necessarilycorrelatedand that it is possible
to conceive of a society with a high level of technology but with a very
2
These problems are nicely analyzed by Armen Alchian, "Some Economics of
Property," RAND Corporation Paper 2316, May 26, 1961.
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Economic Developmentand Cultural Change
limited division of labor,3 empirical evidence presented below indicates
that these four characteristics of complexity form a unilinear scale. Other
problems in regard to this definition, especially in its application, are
discussed in the text and footnotes below.
2. Approach
Two major assumptions underlie the approach of this study.
a) The first assumption is that certain benefits and costs can be adduced for a given property institution; and, moreover, if these benefits
and costs are analyzed in regard to the relevant societal groups, correct
predictionscan be made about the occurrenceof the institution in particular
economies.4 The application of this general assumption to particular
cases, especially in the determination of the concrete benefits and costs or
of the relevant groups in the society, raises a great many complex problems.
Although I have chosen particularinstitutions for examination where such
methodological problems do not arise too acutely, it is necessaryto indicate
briefly what kind of costs and benefits are relevant, especially since most
of the societies considered in this study do not have market valuations on
most of their goods and services.
Benefits accrue to the owner of a particular property right if the
"thing" under consideration has a positive marginal productivity or, in
the case of consumption, has a positive marginal rate of substitution. In
the case of production, this "value" is determined by such oft-discussed
considerations as the level of technology, the availability of the thing, and
the supply of other factors of production. And, with regard to consumption, the value is partly determined by individual preferences.
Such a cost/benefit approach can be used in one of two ways. From
particularcost/benefit considerations, we can set out certain economic (or,
more specifically, developmental) considerations that are necessary for
the occurrenceof a particularproperty right or institution. Or, on the basis
of additional considerations, we might argue that greater economic
benefits than costs lead in all cases to the introduction of a particular
right or institution, that is, that the specified economic conditions are
sufficient for the existence of a particular right or institution. One such
assumption might be that certain groups within primitive societies constantly try to maximize their economic positions, so that we can argue
greater benefits than costs to a particular group leads in all cases to the
3 Such issues are discussed by Martin Orans, "Surplus," Human Organization 25
(Spring 1966): 24-32.
4 This cost/benefit approach is followed in a number of essays and books on
various aspects of property that have recently appeared: Harold Demsetz, "Toward
a Theory of Property Relations," American Economic Review 56 (May 1967): 34759; Mancur Olson, Jr., "Some Historic Variations in Property Institutions" (paper
delivered at the Southern Economic Association Convention, Autumn 1967, New
Orleans, La.); and Steven N. S. Cheung, The Theory of Share Tenancy (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970).
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existence of a particular right or institution. Verification of hypotheses
stated in terms of either necessary or sufficient conditions gives rise to the
same sorts of difficulties (e.g., specification and identification problems),
but positive evidence for hypotheses stated in terms of necessary conditions
does not need to be as strict as in the case of sufficient conditions.
Although the cost/benefit approach may appear novel in the context
of an institutional analysis of primitive societies, it is but one variant of
"functionalism" that is practiced by some anthropologists. Unlike some
varieties of functionalism, however, statistical tests can be set up so that
propositions can be refuted; and, thus, we do not need to deal exclusively
with tautologies. The hypotheses discussed below are stated only in terms
of necessary conditions, which is the more moderate application of the
cost/benefit approach; but quite adequate statistical tests can be carried
out in these terms so that both negative and positive evidence can be systematicallyevaluated. At the end of the essay, I also presentcertain evidence
that the more extreme application of the cost/benefit approach also fits the
data, and I present the results of further statistical tests.
b) The second major assumption on which this essay rests is that, if
the benefits and costs of particular property rights or institutions are
related to the level of economic development, then such institutions should
appear in a cluster of societies arranged according to their relative levels
of development. In other words, if the property rights or institutions are
related to an independent measure of economic development, they can be
considered part of a unilinear scale of development. This, in turn, means
that a point on the development scale can be designated such that societies
at higher levels of development have the right or institution, while those
at a lower level do not. If, for instance, a designated property right or
institution is not present in the sixty poorest economies but is present in
all of the forty richest, then it seems clear that such a right or institution is
related to the level of economic development and that determination of the
level of development of a society is sufficient to decide whether or not it
has the right or institution under consideration. If, on the other hand,
the right or institution exists in a pattern such as in every other economy
along the development scale, then the hypothesis must be rejected. A
third case arises when the property right of institution does not occur in
the sixty poorest economies but is present in half of the forty richest; in
this case, the level of economic development is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the occurrence of such a right or institution.
In order to avoid misinterpretation, it should be noted that the rating
of societies according to the way in which a subset of their properties fall
along a unilineal scale does not imply that, if these societies change,
their degree of development will rise; for the use of the development scale
implies no probabilities about the possibilities of progressive versus
regressive changes; and, moreover, many changes occurring within societies may have no relation to those characteristics with which "develop409
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ment" is determined. Other problems in regard to the definition or
application of the development concept are discussed in the text and footnotes below.
3. Four Sets of Hypotheses
The hypotheses tested below are grouped into four sets, according to the
similarity of their justification or content. The first set of hypotheses concern the factors of production in which property rights exist; these hypotheses have by far the most rigorous economic justification. The next
two sets of hypotheses deal with the specificity of property rights and the
institutions influencing them, especially in regard to the transfer and
delineation of such rights. And a final set of hypotheses concern the generality of such rights, that is, the degree to which particular economic
relations are independent of specific "things" and are institutionalized
into money.
a) Property rights in factors of production.5-Property rights in men
in the form of slavery and in land are the rights most capable of analysis
with the proposed cost/benefit approach.
In regard to slavery, a general proposition can be simply stated:
slaves are held only if they can produce enough of economic value to more
than cover the cost of maintaining them, fitting them out for work, and
guarding them.6 If we also assume that unimproved land is available in
sufficient quantities that land rents cannot be easily collected, then a
number of corollaries and specific hypotheses can be derived from the
general proposition.
In most situations, it is clearly less expensive in terms of resources
to guard slaves from running away if the slaves work together in a group,
where they can be more closely watched (e.g., in agriculture), rather than
if they work in small groups over a large area (e.g., hunting and gathering).
Hypothesis Al: Slavery appears only in predominantly agricultural
societies and does not appear in hunting and gathering societies, other
things remaining equal. Since the data show that primary reliance on
5 The propositions in this section are based on several concepts such as "slavery"
and "subsistence level," about which there is heated controversy. Starting from Harry
Pearson's famous essay ("The Economy has no Surplus," in Trade and Market in
Early Empires, ed. Karl Polanyi et al. [Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957], pp. 320-42)
a considerable body of literature has arisen concerning the meaning of "subsistence
level." Similarly, problems arise in determining what degree of rights of one individual
over another constitute slavery. But, no matter how hard it may be to draw lines in
particularly ambiguous cases, these distinctions rest on gross differences that can be
distinguished in most cases. (For "level of subsistence," see Marvin Harris, "The
Economy Has No Surplus ?" American Anthropologist 61 [April 1959]: 185-99.) That
is, the terms can be operationalized in a more or less adequate manner; a description
of the way in which this was carried out in the data I am using will be published in a
forthcoming book by Robert Carneiro.
6 These
hypotheses about slavery are taken directly from Olson (n. 4 above).
Among other things, they rest on the assumption that sufficient land is available that
land rents cannot be easily obtained (see Evsey Domar, "The Causes of Slavery or
Serfdom: A Hypothesis," Journal of Economic History 30 [March 1970]: 18-32).
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hunting and gathering for food production occurs only at relatively low
levels of development, this hypothesis thus relates slavery to the relative
level of economic development.
Since slaves do not receive many fruits of their labor above the barest
necessities, they have little incentive in most cases (unless they can buy
their freedom) for working very hard and, as a consequence, are probably
less productive than free men. From this consideration, we can argue that
slavery does not pay the slave owner unless the technological level of the
society is high enough so that the average product of labor in the fields is
much more than sufficient to just feed the worker. Hypothesis A2: Slaveholding in a society does not occur until there is a regular surplus of food
produced above the needs of the food producers; that is, the society is
well above the bare subsistence level, other things remaining equal.7
The net costs (production minus maintenance) of slaves are less if
slaves are obtained as adults rather than as children, since there are fewer
costs involved in teaching them the necessary skills of production.8
Hypothesis A3: Therefore, extratribal slavery should be more frequent
than intratribal slavery, and the latter should occur only in societies with
relatively higher levels of economic development, other things remaining
the same.
Before turning to the hypotheses about land, three features of these
hypotheses which hold for the other fourteen hypotheses as well must be
briefly noted. First, because of their simplicity, the three hypotheses avoid
many of the complications that could occur if the cost/benefit approach
were applied to more complex situations. Second, the hypotheses are not
rigorous in the sense that sufficient conditions are established; however,
necessary conditions are put forth which can be statistically tested. And
finally, the ceteris paribus condition at the end of each hypothesis is
quite important, since it allows a certain random condition. This means
that, above or below the critical level of development that is relevant to
the hypothesis, there may be certain societies that do not fit exactly into
the predicted patterns.9 If the random element is too great, the hypothesis
7

Friedrich Engels (The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State

[New York: InternationalPublishers,n.d.]) presentedargumentssimilar to these to
prove the existence of slavery societies that had passed a certain level of economic
development. His analysis differs from mine in two major respects: first, he argued
that development is a sufficientcondition, while here I contend merely that it is a
necessary condition for slavery; second, he argued in terms of societies where the
economy is based primarilyon slavery, while I am concernedonly with the existence
of slavery,even though it may not be of criticalimportanceto the economic functioning of the society.
8 If slave-raidingparties are organized to obtain slaves from other tribes, then
the costs of extratribalslaveryare not zero; in most cases, however,slaves are obtained
as a by-productfrom other activitiessuch as war and, as a result, have a low marginal
cost. There are also, of course, certain trainingcosts of extratribalslaves as well. All
of these costs seem lower in most cases than the resourcecosts of raising slaves.
9 For instance, the justification for hypothesis A2 is in terms of the average
product of labor. However, if the marginalproductivityof labor is very much lower
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does not hold; the use of a probability model does, however, allow us to
distinguish between these two cases.
In a situation where unimproved land is available for all and where
agriculturaltechnology is very simple, there are no economic justifications
for claims longer than one planting cycle on a particular piece of land. If
cultivators of land use a technology such that agriculturalpractices in one
year affect productivity in the next year, then there are some obvious
economic benefits to those making improvements (investments) in a
particular piece of land to assert long-term claims on its use. Hypothesis
A4: Therefore, we would expect above a certain point on the development
scale to find continuous ownership (disposition) rights by individuals or
families over land which has been improved, even after the cultivated plot,
house site, etc., is abandoned, other things remaining the same. If land
plots become relatively scarce, this tendency toward continuous-ownership
claims on use is reinforced (see also below).
We are now at a point to see an important possible relationship
between inequality and the level of development. If improvement of land
brings considerable returns or if slaveholding is profitable, then property
income can become important, and a source of income inequality arises.
Indeed, the higher the productivity of labor, the more beneficial real and
slave property can be to its owner. Furthermore, since there are certain
economies of scale of protection (if a piece of land can be successfully
guarded by a watchman walking the perimeter, then two watchmen can
guard four times the property that one watchman can, since the area
increases to the square as the boundary doubles), the benefits of property
inequality rise more than the cost when more property is obtained or when
the productivity of property rises. Thus, at higher levels of economic
development, there are necessary conditions for greater economic
inequality.
For someone holding claims on the use of land to obtain large economic benefits from his land, it is often necessaryfor some part of the land
to be cultivated by slaves or tenants. As long as free land is available or
land distant from the community on which it is difficult for those holding
nominally exclusive rights to enforce their claims, then tenancy does not
pay the tenant, since he can always get the use of certain lands for himself
without paying for their use. It is economic scarcity, either natural or
contrived, that make tenancy inescapable for landless agriculturalists.
There are, as many have noted, certain positive relations between
economic development and land scarcity. It is well known that economic
development is positively related to sizes of communities, and a scarcity
than the average product, the hypothesis will not hold, and the pattern of slaveholding societies on the development scale will appear quite irregular. By including
the case of a considerable difference between marginal and average productivity
among the "random factors," however, the analysis can proceed if a probability
model is used for testing the hypotheses.
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arises of land "close" to the community. "Closeness" can, of course, be
affected by the methods of transportation, the sphere of military influence,
etc.; but these should not blind us to the basic relationships that can exist
between land scarcity and development.
The necessary conditions for land tenancy thus rest on the existence
of economic inequality and an economic scarcity of land. And, above a
certain point on the development scale, the necessary conditions for these
two factors also exist. We thus arrive through a chain of reasoning1o to
Hypothesis A5: At a relatively high level along the development scale,
rental of land by landlords to tenants will appear as a common system of
tenure, other things remaining the same.
Up to now, I have made no distinction between individual and family
"claims on the use of some land." It seems to be commonly agreed among
anthropologists that property rights by single individuals in personal items
and movable property is manifested at quite low levels of economic
development; individual (as opposed to family) property rights of land
appears at a much higher level of development. From the cost/benefit
standpoint from which I have been arguing, a number of reasons can be
adduced to support such a proposition. For instance, the higher the amount
of production over cost (net production) from a particular piece of land,
the more an individual property holder can afford to buy protection for
his property rather than relying on his family. And the higher the net
production and the greater the effects of investment on a particular piece
of land, the more the economic interests of a single individual who is
working a piece of land can diverge from those of his family. And the
higher the net production and the greater the effects of investment on a
particular piece of land, the more the economic interests of a single
individual who is working a piece of land can diverge from those of his
family. Unfortunately, I do not have sufficientdata to test any proposition
about the increasing importance of individual property claims in land at
higher levels of economic development in a direct fashion."1 Indirect
evidence is, however, available from the examination of inheritance institutions, and it is to such matters that we now turn.
b) The transferofproperty rights.-The above hypotheses all deal with
the kinds of rights that are exercised over particular factors of production.
The cost/benefit analysis can also be applied to property institutions, of
10 There is also a hidden assumption that higher labor productivity is necessarily
associated with a higher level of economic development, a relationship that has been
disputed by some (e.g., Orans [n. 3 above]) but which has sufficient weight for the
burden of proof to be on those that dispute it. This proposition has also been often
argued on noneconomic grounds.
11 Some data on this matter are presented by Robert B. Textor (A Cross-cultural
Summary [New Haven, Conn.: Human Relations Area File Press, 1967]) in his
"finished characteristic" 135. Unfortunately, data for only fourteen societies whose
relative level of economic development are determined in this study are presented.
This seems too small a sample from which to draw conclusions.
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which an important class includes those institutions which structure the
delineation and transfer of property rights between members of society.
In regard to delineation and transfer institutions, the general (and
almost tautological) proposition underlying the hypotheses below is quite
simple: the higher the level of economic development and the greater the
wealth, the greater the possibilities of serious disputes over wealth and the
more there is at stake in such disputes. Greater wealth thus gives rise to
greater benefits in explicit delineation of property rights and the ways in
which property can be transferred.12Since the costs of institutions concerning such matters need not be great and since the benefits are greater at
higher levels of development, a number of testable hypotheses can be
quickly derived.
If there is not appreciable accumulation of wealth, the disposition of
personal wealth after death is not very important; and, without much loss
to anyone, such wealth could even be destroyed. However, at some level
of economic development, such accumulation of individual wealth will
become important enough to be desired by heirs, and the benefits of inheritance rules become apparent. Hypothesis BI: At some point along the
scale of economic development, most individual property in goods is
transmitted by inheritance rather than being destroyed at the death of the
owner, other things remaining equal.
If the above proposition is true, then, from the considerations discussed above about the emergence of individual as opposed to family
property in land, it would seem likely that inheritance of movable property
would precede inheritance of landed (real) property.13 Hypothesis B2:
Formal inheritance procedures appear at lower level on the development
scale for movable than for real property, other things remaining the same.
From the general proposition, it should also be apparent that, the
greater the wealth, the greater the benefits of highly formal procedures of
12
One possible ambiguity in these and the following remarks arises because
different evaluations may be placed on such wealth. As the level of development
rises, the "amount" of wealth in a society rises when measured in constant prices (or
when considered in sheer physical terms); but, when measured in current prices (or
in current opportunity costs), the situation is not so clear. It is useful to distinguish
here between wealth in long-lasting consumer goods and in factors of production. In
the case of consumer goods, we have evidence that the income elasticity of demand is
considerably greater than unity, so that the amount of such wealth, when measured
in current opportunity costs, increases with a rising level of economic development.
In regard to wealth in land, as productivity rises, the value of the produce of the land
rises, and, ceteris paribus, we might expect that the relative exchange value of the land
would rise. A similar argument can be adduced for capital; and, in addition, it is
possible that the capital/output ratio of the society might also increase-at least to a
certain plateau-because
of the increase in the physical amount of capital as well.
13 As many anthropologists have argued (e.g., Melville J. Herskovits, Economic
Anthropology [New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1952], chap. 15), even very primitive
hunting and gathering societies have familial property rights in land. Both real and
movable properties exist in all societies of the sample, so that the proposition cannot
be argued on the grounds that real property does not exist at certain levels of development.
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inheritance, especially since the latter are not necessarily much more
expensive. Hypothesis B3: At a relatively high stage of economic development, testamentary disposition of property appears, either by a written
will, through a formal executor, or orally in the presence of a witness,
other things remaining equal.
In addition to inheritance institutions, other arrangements exist for
the transfer of property. Special situations arise in the cases of individual
property where the owners die without direct descendants (for the inheritance rules to apply) or heirs (for the testamentaryrules to apply). The more
valuable the property, the more beneficial to the political leaders that its
disposition be regularized by intervention from the government of the
society. In the case of land, such regularization would appear at a further
point on the development scale than where continuous claims of ownership
rights by individuals or families would appear. Hypothesis B4: At a relatively high stage of development, agricultural land would revert to the
chief, king, or state as personal property or for reassignment when the
owner abandons the lands or dies without heirs (i.e., escheat), other things
remaining the same.
A final aspect of the transfer of property rights concerns the procedures for forfeiting such rights. One traditional way of forfeiting any
kind of rights is by punishment for some kind of crime or violation of
societal rules. At higher levels of economic development, as noted above,
individual wealth is greater, and it becomes increasingly possible to punish
a person by confiscating his property. Since this procedure is easier and
less expensive to administer than other types of punishment involving
compensation and since there can be more at stake in such a transaction at
higher levels of development, the necessary conditions for its appearance
should be clear. Hypothesis B5: At some state of economic development,
certain offenses begin to be punished by confiscation of property (of
which part may go to the offended party), other things remaining the same.
c) Delineation of property rights.-Problems of the delineation of
rights occur, not only in inheritance situations, but also in the very exercise
of such rights. Such delineation can be almost costless, and, according to
the general proposition stated in the above subsection, the benefits
increase with more and more wealth at stake.
Delineation of the land area over which an individual or family has
rights of use can be used to verify a corollary to the general proposition,
for, once productivity of improved land is much greater than unimproved
land or once land has some scarcity value, the benefits of strictly defining
the boundaries of such property become apparent. Hypothesis Cl: Shortly
after the point on the development scale where landed property occurs,
there should also arise the existence of continuous boundaries such as
fences, rows or walls of stone, paths, ditches, or hedges to delimit agricultural fields, other things remaining equal. This is not a very strong hypothesis but points the direction toward more interesting propositions.
415
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With higher levels of economic development and greater productivity
of land, there are increasing benefits for continually more formal delineation of land rights. Hypothesis C2: At a relatively high stage of economic
development, there should arise a formal inscription of land or other forms
of property through a registry of deeds, other things remaining the same.
The public inscription of wealth has benefits to the society as a whole
as well as the individual; the private recording of wealth benefits primarily
the individual. The greater the wealth, the more property rights can be
exercised, and the greater the benefits of the private recording of wealth so
as to exercise such benefits to the greatest advantage. Thus, there is a
relationship between economic development, wealth, and the benefits of
such managementdevices. HypothesisC3: At some point along the development scale, probably preceding the appearance of the public inscription of
wealth, private recorded inventories of wealth should appear, other things
remaining the same.
d) Generalizedproperty rights: money.-Up to now, we have been
discussing property rights and institutions associated with very specific
goods, services, and things, for example, pieces of land, rights in people,
personal items, and so forth. But it should also be apparent that certain
property rights can be defined in a more general and indirect way so that
they represent a series of more specific property rights. Thus, we can have
command over resources or goods in two ways: direct property rights in
each resource or good or a generalized property right which allows such
resources or goods to be obtained or used. There are two major benefits of
such generalized property rights.
First, as the number of different goods available for domestic trading
increases, the number of possible different trades (i.e., pairs of goods in
exchange) rises even faster (according to the well-known combinatorial
rules). This is the origin of the problem of the "coincidence of wants," the
oft-discussed difficulty of finding a trading partner with complementary
needs and surpluses. A generalized property right such as money greatly
facilitates trade.
Second, as wealth increases, the ease of managing such wealth increases when the differenttypes of property rights can be expressed according to common numeraire. Although exchange value, as measured in
monetary prices, catches only one facet of such property rights, it is an
important one; and the positive relationship between the benefits of a
generalized property right and the amount of individual wealth should be
apparent.
Higher levels of economic development are associated with greater
per-capita trade and greater individual wealth. Thus, the benefits of a
generalized property right is positively associated with the level of economic development. Furthermore,the costs of such a generalized right are
probably independent of the level of development or even inversely related
(since more advanced technologies allow more usable moneys to be made
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more easily). From these considerations, we can frame a general proposition: At higher levels of economic development, the necessary conditions
for the use of increasingly more elaborate generalized property rights
appear. A number of simple deductions from this proposition can be made.
One of the least elaborate generalized property rights is a standardized
medium of exchange which serves in particular circumstances a money
role.14 Hypothesis DI: At some point on the development scale, a standardized medium of exchange appears, other things remaining the same.
A more formal (and possibly more costly) generalized property right
occurs when the medium of exchange is given a highly standardized form.
Hypothesis D2: At a higher stage of development, one or more types of
coined money will appear, other things remaining the same.
The development of money lessens the cost not only of individual
exchange but of public exchange as well. Transfer of goods and services
to the political leaders by the population appears easier. With wider use
of a standardized medium of exchange, the process can be simplified and
the administrative costs lowered by carrying out such transactions, at
least partly, in the form of money. Hypothesis D3: At the same or higher
development stage, taxes are collected in money, other things remaining
the same. It must be explicitly noted that argumentation for this proposition runs contraryto the suggestion sometimes found in the anthropological
literature that noncommercial uses of money preceded commercial uses.
These three hypotheses are, of course, quite obvious. A more difficult
situation to analyze is a generalized property right for the temporary use of
goods or resources. This can be examined by noting that paralleling the
emergence of generalized property relations and the development of exchange is a much clearer recognition of opportunity costs. As long as
goods cannot be easily exchanged for other goods, the opportunity costs
of temporarily lending particular goods to someone else cannot, in many
cases, be easily measured. If goods have prices on them, loans can be more
easily viewed in terms, not only of forgone consumption, but also of
missed investment opportunities; that is, the costs of a loan to the lender
become more apparent. Since an interest charge is a generalized right for
compensation for the opportunity costs of lending and since these costs
become more apparent in situations where there is a standardizedmedium
of exchange (and where opportunity costs can be easily calculated), we
can thus see a link between the level of development and economic
14 Many primitive economies do not have money in the sense of a completely
generalized medium of exchange, unit of account, store of value, and standard of
deferred payment, but rather limited-purpose monies serving one or two of these
functions for a limited range of transactions. (This is explicated by George Dalton,
"Primitive Money," American Anthropologist 67 [February 1965]: 44-65.) In the
following hypotheses, I am not concerned about some money-stuff that plays all of the
roles of money, but rather about a money-stuff that plays the role of a medium of
exchange for an appreciable range of ordinary goods and services. The exact coding
definitions of such "money" will be presented in a forthcoming book by Robert
Carneiro.
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conditions for the existence of interest. Hypothesis D4: At a point on the
development scale after the introduction of a standardized medium of
exchange, money or goods begin to be lent out at interest, other things
remaining the same. It must be noted that, although the emergence of
interest has been argued on social and other grounds as well, no such
specific hypothesis about the point of origin has been enunciated, at least
in the literature I have been able to locate.
On the whole, many of the seventeen hypotheses discussed above are
common in the literature of economics or anthropology. And many have
been justified or explained by a variety of social, political, and ecological
reasons. Although the very simple benefit/cost arguments outlined above
may seem quite naive to those who are aware of the complexity of most
primitive societies and of the importance of analyzing economic institutions in a societal context, it is also important to bear in mind Ockham's
principle of simplicity and the analytical advantages of linking a variety
of seemingly unrelated phenomena to a single principle. We return to such
questions at the end of the paper; it seems better to explore the statistical
methods and to see if the hypotheses are verified before examining these
more abstract and broader issues.
C. Statistical Problems
Two major statistical problems must be faced before the propositions
stated above can be tested: The firstis devising a method to rank the various
primitive societies according to their relative levels of economic development; the second is obtaining sufficientdata to carry out such a task. Each
of these difficulties is discussed in turn below.
1. Determining the Relative Level of Economic Development
The major analytic tool used here for ranking societies according to their
relative level of economic development is the scalogram analysis devised
by Louis Guttman 15 and applied in the analysis of development of primitive economies by Robert L. Carneiro.16 Since this technique may be
15 Louis Guttman's early work on scaling techniques is summarized in Samuel
A. Stouffer, Louis Guttman, et al., Measurements and Prediction (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1950). The most useful descriptions of numerical techniques in scaling that we have found are: Allen L. Edwards, Techniques of Attitude
Scale Construction (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. 1957), and Warren S.
Torgerson, Methods of Scaling (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958). Scaling
techniques have been continually improved with the introduction of computer
methods, but none of the available programs could be used with the extremely large
data matrix used in this study.
16 Carneiro and his associates have written a series of essays on the subject,
including: "Scale Analysis as an Instrument for the Study of Cultural Evolution,"
Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 28 (Summer 1962): 149-69; (with Stephen F.
Tobias) "The Application of Scale Analysis to the Study of Cultural Evolution,"
Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, 2d ser. 26 (1963): 196-207; "On
the Relation between Size of Population and Complexity of Social Organization,"
Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 23 (Autumn 1967): 234-44; "Scale Analysis,
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unfamiliar to economists, a brief explanation is warranted. The key idea
behind the scalogram analysis is the "dichotomous cumulative trait."
A trait is dichotomous if there are only two possible ratings that the
thing rated (e.g., persons, societies, etc.) can take. For instance, for a person
the trait "being six feet tall or over" is dichotomous, while height in feet is
not, since a person's height can take an infinite number of values.
For a group of societies, a set of traits are "cumulative" if a society
with a higher ranking has all the traits of a society with a lower rank plus
a number of additional traits. This also means that, if trait A ranks above
trait B, the former trait is possessed by all the societies that possess the
latter plus a number of additional societies. A different way of looking at
this cumulative phenomenon is to examine rankings of societies or traits
using different subsets of societies and traits; a society that ranks higher
than another on one scale (i.e., using one subset of traits) maintains this
relative position when another scale is used; and a trait that is possessed
by more societies than another also maintains this relative position with
other scales (i.e., using another subset of societies). A further implication
is that, if we are given the relative position of a trait, we can predict what
societies possess it.
A simple example of a set of dichotomous, cumulative traits is a set
of traits based on the height continuum. Let us suppose that we have four
traits: (1) being four feet tall or over; (2) being five feet tall or over; (3)
being six feet tall or over; (4) being seven feet tall or over. Each of these is
a dichotomous trait. Furthermore, if a person scores positively in only
one trait, it must be the first; in two traits, the first two on the list. If one
person has a higher rating than another, then he must score as high or
higher on all the traits in the scale.
This scalogram technique can be extended to the level of economic
development quite easily. One hoary proposition is that, the higher the
level of economic development, the greater the division of labor. Let us
select the following four different measures of division of labor: the
existence of a political leader who is a full-time specialist (i.e., does not
regularly engage in subsistence agriculture); the existence of a full-time
teacher (i.e., professional, secular instructor); the existence of a special
full-time religious practitioner (e.g., priest); and the existence of a fulltime craft specialist (e.g., brewer, lapidary, tailor, baker, tanner, etc.).
Taking four primitive societies, the Rwala, the Ancient Incas, the Thonga,
and the Semang, we can obtain the data which are given in table 1 below
(the figure 1 indicates the existence of the trait; 0, its absence).
Evolutionary Sequences, and the Rating of Cultures," in Handbook of Method in
Anthropology, ed. Raoul Naroll and Ronald Cohen (New York: Natural History
Press, 1970); "Ascertaining, Testing, and Interpreting Sequences of Cultural Development," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 24 (Winter 1968): 354-74; and (with
Daisy F. Hilse) "The Measurement of Cultural Evolution in the Ancient Near East
and in Anglo-Saxon England," forthcoming.
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TABLE 1
EXISTENCE OF FULL-TIME OCCUPATIONS IN FOUR SOCIETIES:
DATA
UNREARRANGED
TRAITS

SOCIETIES
Rwala ..............
Ancient Incas ........
Thonga .............
Semang .............
Total societies per
trait ............

Political
Leader

Secular
Teacher

Religious
Practitioner

Craft
Specialist

Total
per Society

1
1
1
0

0
1
0
0

1
1
1
1

0
1
1
0

2
4
3
1

3

1

4

2

If the rows and columns can be rearranged in order so that the l's
form a "triangle," then we have a set of cumulative traits forming a Guttman scale. As a start, it is useful to rearrange the rows and columns in
ascending order of the total traits. The results are given in table 2 below.
A Guttman scale can indeed be formed from the societies and traits
since the 1-values form a triangle."7Thus, the extent of the division of
labor appears to be a unidimensional scale. From such results, we can
also conclude that the Semang have the lowest and the Ancient Incas had
the highest level of economic development, a conclusion that seems quite
reasonable from what we know from the literature dealing with these two
societies.18
TABLE 2
EXISTENCE OF FULL-TIME OCCUPATIONS IN FOUR SOCIETIES:
REARRANGED DATA
TRAITS

SOCIETIES

Semang .............
Rwala ..............
Thonga .............
Ancient Incas ........
Total societies per
trait ............

Secular
Teacher

Craft
Specialist

Political
Leader

0
0
0
1

0
0
1
1

0
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1

2

3

4

Total Traits
Religious
Practitioner per Society
1
2
3
4

17 "Triangle" is a shorthand description of the fact that the line connecting the
cutoff point (described below) must always proceed upward or to the left (assuming
that the data are arranged as in table 2).
18 One problem of interpretation of "economic development" arises because we
are dealing with societies of greatly different sizes (e.g., the Incas and the Semang).
A very small society, no matter how high its level of technology, would have certain
limitations placed on its division of labor; while a society composed of a large number
of people is likely to have a certain division of labor with a relatively low level of
technology. (For instance, if it is politically centralized, there will be full-time political
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Before turning to more specific problems of calculating a Guttman
scale for the problem at hand, several general observations about his
approach are offered in order to avoid misunderstanding.
First of all, the use of this method does not rest on any theory about
how specific societies function or change. There is nothing in this technique
that is based on any particular theory of economic development, except
insofar as any theory is predicated on the implicit notion that "economic
development" or "complexity of the economy" is a unidimensional continuum. Similarly, this technique does not rest on the approaches of
evolutionalist, diffusionist, structural-functionalist,or structuralistschools
in anthropology.19
Second, this approach does not imply that other aspects of societies,
especially those where economic elements may play a more secondary role
(e.g., family structure, religious beliefs, or political forms), are necessarily
related to the derived rankings of relative economic development, and,
indeed, experiments along these lines showed that there were few such
relationships.20

Third, the proof that the traits selected actually form a cumulative
scale can only be seen in the process of rearrangingthe rows and columns
to form such a scale. That is, although the traits are originally chosen on
the basis of various a priori hypotheses about their relation to "economic
development" (see below), the only indication of whether we chose the
traits correctly is whether or not they form a unidimensional (cumulative)
scale.
officialsand religiousspecialists.)However,it should be clear that the level of development and the size of a functioningeconomy are probablypositively related: the small
society with a high level of technologywould find it advantageousto grow in size (e.g.,
through conquest) in order to utilize such technology through a more extensive division of labor; similarly,a large society with a low level of technology would probably
not (except for the political and religious factors mentioned above) act as a single
economic unit, so that the division of labor outside the several centralized political
functions would be quite limited. Since 156 traitscoveringa wide numberof economic
activities in these societies are used, the scaling technique to determine the level of
developmentshould, in most cases, transcendthe influenceof size sufficientlyso that
the effects of the letter can be treatedas a randomelement. Finally, it must be added
that many of the hypotheses to be tested cannot be justified on the basis of scale or
economic complexity; and, since it turns out that all of the hypothesesare validated,
we have somejustificationin believingthat the scalingtechniqueactuallydoes measure
the relative level of development.
19 This technique has been employed by neoevolutionists such as Carneiro, but
is not an exclusive tool of this approach. That is, there is no assumption that, when
societies change, they necessarilychange in a forwarddirection indicated by development scale.
20 I conducted a statistical fishing expedition with the 536 "finishedcharacteristics" presented by Textor (n. 11 above) to see how many of these are significantly
related to the level of economic development. Almost none of the social variables
(especiallythose dealing with family structure)and few of the religious, political, and
other noneconomic variables showed such a relationship. The investigation was
complicated by the fact that, for many of the variables, the sample was quite small.
For those noneconomic variables that do correlate, see Carneiro and Tobias (n. 16
above).
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Finally, if the rating of the societies according to the selected traits
contains errors, or if the traits selected do not truly reflect a particular
place on the economic development scale, or if economic development is a
multidimensional phenomenon, then certain "nonscale elements" appear
in the matrix; that is the 1-values do not form a triangle. If this is the case,
then two procedures must be followed. First, we must devise a way to
measure the degree of difference from a perfect scale in order to ascertain
whether or not such deviation is systematic or random. Second, we must
devise procedures to improve the scaling by rearranging the rows and
columns in a different way.
Louis Guttman has introduced the concept of "reproducibility" as a
measure of approximation to a perfect scale. The "coefficient of reproducibility" is a measure of approximation to a perfect scale and is defined as
united minus the ratio of errors (a 0-value where a 1-value should be, and
vice versa) to the total number of scaled items in the matrix. By maximizing
the coefficient of reproducibility, the probability of correctly predicting
the traits that a society possesses increases. The concept of erroris slippery,
however, for there are several techniques to determine what traits a society
"should" possess. This is the problem of establishing the "cutoff" or
"cutting points," that is, the place in the rank order of societies where the
most common response shifts from a 0-value to a 1-value. The difficulty
can be most clearly seen in a numerical example given in table 3 below.
Using a technique by Goodenough and Edwards, the cutoff point is
determined by the number of societies per trait. Thus, for trait 1, the cutoff
point is three from the bottom, while, for trait 4, it is seven from the bottom. These are drawn in with long straight lines (for a moment the short
TABLE 3
AN ILLUSTRATION

OF THE DIFFICULTIES IN MAXIMIZING
OF REPRODUCIBILITY

THE COEFFICIENT

TRAIT NUMBER

SOCIETIES
1 ........
2........
3........
4........
5........
6........
7........
8 ........
9 ........
10 .......
Total
societies
per trait.

1

2

3

4

Total Traits
per Society

0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1

0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1

0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
4
4

3

4

6

7
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lines should be neglected). Thus, the Goodenough-Edwards technique
gives an unambiguous method of ranking societies and traits (except in
cases of tie scores) and, it should be clear, an unambiguous coefficient of
reproducibility, even when tie scores among the traits or societies occur.21
In the above example, there are eight errors and forty (4 x 10) ratings, so
that the coefficient of reproducibility is 1 - (8/40) = .80.
It should be clear that the coefficient of reproducibility can be raised
by changing the cutoff lines used in calculating the coefficient. For trait
1, the total number of errorscan be reduced by placing the cutoff line above
society 9; similarly, for trait 4 above society 5. For trait 3, the cutoff line
can be placed above society 7 or 5 with the same number of errors (two).
Using such a method (which is called the "Cornell technique"), cutoff
points are placed where the short straight lines are drawn, and the derived
coefficient of reproducibility is 1 - (5/40) = .875. In cases of larger
matrices, the Cornell technique can result in still higher scores by rearranging the rows and columns. However, as Edwards has pointed out,
it then becomes impossible to predict the traits of a society with the accuracy of the coefficient of reproducibility unless more information than the
trait score is supplied. And I would add that there is no longer an unambiguous ranking of traits and societies since, as demonstrated with trait 3,
there are three different places where the cutoff point can be placed.
Although both techniques are employed below, the results are quite
similar: the Spearmen'scoefficient of rank correlation between the country
rankings using the two techniques is .98; and between the trait rankings
(Experiment B), .95.
It would be useful to have some measureof the statistical significance
of the calculated coefficients of reproducibility, but so far no such measures
are available. Part of the difficulty arises from a geometrical complication
-if there is a small number of 1-values or 0-values, a random pattern
would have a very much higher coefficient. One method of gaining insight
into whether the derived pattern of 1- and 0-values (after the GoodenoughEdwards or the Cornell ranking technique has been employed) is statistically meaningful is to compare the "errors" with that of a random pattern
derived from a matrix of the same size and cutoff line as in the whole of the
ranked matrix. For example, let us suppose that we have a matrix with
ten societies and twenty traits and that there are forty I-values (20 percent
of the ratings). If we use the Goodenough-Edwards technique, the cutoff
line defines two areas with, respectively, forty and 160 ratings. Table 4
shows how the comparison pattern is derived.
The table is constructed by assuming that the number of 1-values and
0-values are the same as the table to be examined but that the chances of
either value appearing above or below the cutoff line depend only on the
21
It can also easily be shown that the cofficient of reproducibility is the same if
the cutoff point is measured horizontally (i.e., from the societies) rather than vertically
(from the traits) when the Goodenough-Edwards technique is employed.
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TABLE 4
AN ILLUSTRATION

OF THE DERIVATION

OF THE COMPARATIVE

"RANDOM"

PATTERN

Total Ratings* No. 0-Valuest No. 1-Valuest
Above cutoff line ...
Below cutoff line ....
Total ............

160
40

128
32

32
8

200

160

40

* 200 in example.

t 80 percentin example.
t 20 percentin example.
numberof ratings defined by this line. The patterns derived from the ranked
table and from the "random" table are then compared, and a simple X2
calculation is carried out to see if they differ.22
Turning now to the specific problem at hand, the relative levels of
economic development of the 100 primitive societies in the sample were
determined by a scalogram using 156 different traits. In selecting them, I
took advantage of some generally accepted propositions about the manifestations of economic development as reflected in the complexity of the
economy. More specifically, a higher stage of economic development is
reflectedby: a finer division of labor, a higher level of technology, a greater
diversity of production above the bare subsistence level, and a greater
elaborateness of economic organization. Thus, traits were selected that
are related to the existence of specific occupations (examples are given in
table I above); technology (e.g., existence of the plow, existence of bridges
or sewers, use of arch in architecture, etc.); consumption products above
those food products needed for subsistence (e.g., glass or pottery items,
metal luxury goods, etc.); and complex economic institutions (e.g., large
urban settlements, guilds, wage labor, permanent markets, etc.). Preliminary tests showed that the derived rank orders of societies were
significantly highly correlated when ranked separately by each of these
criteria.
22
My techniqueof comparingthe resultsto a random patternand then calculata
ing x2 statistic is a variant of a techniqueanalyzedby Karl F. Schuessler("A Note
on StatisticalSignificanceof Scalograms,"Sociometry24 [September1961]: 312-18).
It must be noted that this technique does not prove that traits form a cumulative
scale but rather that the traits vary significantlyfrom a random pattern in the two
areas defined by the cutoff point. This test is, however, quite suited for testing
"necessarybut not sufficient"conditions; a test of sufficiencywould involve examination of the proportion of errors in areas at differentdistances from the cutoff line.
This x2 techniquecan also be used to examine the statisticalsignificanceof the scaling
of a single row (see below). Other more-complexmethods of statistical analysis are
also available (Leo A. Goodman, "Simple [sic] Statistical Methods for Scalogram
Analysis,"Psychometrika24 [March 1959]: 29-43, surveys this literature).However,
the large size of the matrix and the particularway in which the hypothesesare stated
make the above-describedX2test the most appropriate.
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For the ranking of the traits and the societies, we have a matrix of
15,600 items. Using the Goodenough-Edwards technique, I counted the
items that did and did not appear in the proper place above and below the
cutoff line and calculated a coefficient of reproducibility. With the same
rank order of societies, I then rearrangedthe order of traits and, using the
Cornell technique, calculated a new coefficient of reproducibility (Experiment A), which, as one would suspect, is somewhat higher. Then, I rearranged both the order of the societies and the traits, and, using the
Cornell technique again, calculated still another coefficient of reproducibility (Experiment B), which is slightly higher than that in the previous
experiment.23All of these results are presented in table 5 below.
To gain perspective, I present comparison patterns calculated on the
assumption that the proportion of 1- and 0-values is the same for the two
areas defined by the cutoff line. Coefficients of reproducibility can also be
calculated for these random pattern tables and are presented for comparison purposes. Finally, I compare the actual and the random patterns
and calculate a X2statistic (1 degree of freedom).
It should be clear that the coefficient of reproducibility in all three
cases is considerably higher than that derived from a random pattern. The
X2coefficientsderivedfrom comparingthe actual data to the random pattern
are all statistically significant far above the .99 level. Although the use of
the Cornell technique improves the coefficient of reproducibility,loosening
the constraints about rearrangingthe rows and columns and about drawing
the cutoff lines does not greatly change matters.
Two conclusions of importance for this study can be drawn from these
results. First, the 156 traits chosen appear to fall along a unidimensional
scale that indicates the relative levels of economic development; that is,
the scalogram technique based on traits related to economic complexity
proves a satisfactory method. Second, both the Goodenough-Edwards and
the Cornell technique yield quite satisfactory results, and, therefore, we
must make a decision as to which is the most appropriate to use. Use of
the Cornell technique (for both the matrix determining level of development and for the individual traits to be tested) gives higher X2values than
the Goodenough-Edwards technique (for both the matrix determining
level of development and for the individual traits to be tested). Furthermore, the former method also seems more appropriate if we are worried
about necessary and sufficient conditions. Therefore, it was chosen. Lists
of the 100 societies, the 156 traits and their rankings using the various
23
This procedure was carried out by a semimechanized iterative process in which
the computer printed out the matrix, decisions were made as to what rows or what
columns were to be interchanged, proper instructions were given to the computer,
and another matrix was printed out. The process continued until a close visual inspection revealed no rearrangement that would result in fewer errors, a process that
took nine iterations. Undoubtedly, more-refined methods would be able to reduce
the errors somewhat, but the size of the matrix and the capacity of the small computer
available to me prevented the use of such techniques.
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TABLE 5
RESULTS

OF THE SCALING

GOODENOUGH-EDWARDS

EXPERIMENTS

CORNELL

TECHNIQU

A
EXPERIMENT

TECHNIQUE

Data
0-Values

1-Values

Total

0-Values

1-Values

Above cutoff line ....
Below cutoff line .....

12032
699

699
2170

12731
2869

12345
386

690
2179

Total ...........

12731

2869

15600

12731

2869

"Random" Comparison P
0-Values

1-Values

Total

0-Values

1-Values

Above cutoff line ....
Below cutoff line .....

10390
2341

2341
528

12731
2869

10638
2093

2397
472

Total ...........

12731

2869

15600

12731

2869

Summary Statistics

Actual Data
Total errors* ..................1398
Coefficient of reproducibility

X2t.........................

..

Random
Comparison
Pattern
4682
.70

.91

7669.
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Actual Data

R
Com
P

1076
.93

9055.

* Zero-valueswhere 1-values should be, and vice versa.
t It must be emphasizedthat the x2 statisticrelatesto the differencebetween the a
it can be used to determinethe degree to which the traits form a unidimensionalscale
fit." Two extremepatterns of the errors are possible to visualize. The errors could be
non that would be consistent with the notion that the possibilities of observationerr
societiesaround this line. Or the errorscould be randomly distributed.This latter pat
are minimized,but also, perhaps, that some unspecifiedfactor is impinging upon th
dimensionalphenomenon, such a factor would have to be taken into account.
One simple way of determiningwhich error pattern is predominant is to count
around the cutoff line and compare the result with what would be expected if the err
(ExperimentB), the following results are obtained: If the band is defined as five so
with the assumption of a random distributionof errors, we would expect to find nine
of the total errors because at the extreme end of the matrix the band has less than fiv
times as many). If the band is defined as ten societies on either side of the cutoff line,
randomness 182 errors but find 390 (about 2.1 times as many) instead. It is note
patternis greateras the band becomes narrower.Thus, the first pattern-where the
appears to predominate. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the matrices whe
ployed. The results of this additional test thus give further confirmation of the cor
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techniques, and the results of the statistical tests using the GoodenoughEdward technique can be obtained from me.
2. The Data
The data used for making the scale analysis come from a team project
directed by Robert L. Carneiro at the American Museum of Natural
History (AMNH) in New York City. Basing its research on a list of 356
traits,24the AMNH team investigated 100 differentprimitive societies that
were chosen so that societies from all different parts of the world are
represented(in order to minimize influences of cultural diffusion). The raw
materials were reports of field studies that have appeared in the anthropological literature for many decades.
In order to gain some idea of the accuracy of this work, it is useful to
cross-check these ratings against others that have been compiled. The data
of thirty-two cross-cultural anthropological studies are summarized and
analyzed in a book by Robert B. Textor,25 and, in addition, computer
cards with such data are available from the Human Relations Area File
at Yale University.
Although Textor presents data for 400 societies, only fifty-five of them
are the same as in the Carneiro study. And, out of the 536 traits presented
by Textor, only thirty-three are sufficiently close to the Carneiro traits to
warrant comparing. Finally, out of these thirty-three, only eighteen are
economic traits that are used in this study. The results of such a comparison
of these economic traits can be easily summarized.26
Out of the 683 ratings of the eighteen economic traits for the different
societies from the Textor and Carneiro studies that are comparable, the
same results are obtained in 82 percent of the cases. Part of the disagreement can be traced to slightly different definitions and concepts used in
the two studies. In order to take this into account, the eighteen sets of
traits wererated accordingto the degreeof closeness before the comparisons
were actually carried out. In the most comparable group, the differences
between the two studies is 10 percent; in the least comparable group, 26
percent. Thus, the distribution of errors appears in the expected direction.
The disagreements between the two sources can be investigated in
other ways as well. First, the greatest amount of disagreement between the
two sources should occur around the cutoff line, where random factors
24
Robert L. Carneiro and Stephen F. Tobias, "Trait List to Be Used for the Study
of Cultural Evolution by Means of Scale Analysis," 4th ed., mimeographed (New
York: American Museum of Natural History, 1963).
25 Textor (n. 11 above). Most of the cross-cultural tabulations summarized by
Textor come from the materials of the Human Relations Area File (HRAF). The
Carneiro-Tobias data were not taken from this source but rather from a wide number
of monographs, many of which are not included in the HRAF materials. Thus, the
comparisons between the Textor and Carneiro-Tobias data cover errors due to differences in coding and, in part, to differences in observation.
26
A more detailed summary can be obtained from me.
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play the most important role. If the cutoff line (Goodenough-Edwards
technique) is bracketed so that 20 percent of the societies for which data
are available in both sources are included, then we should expect considerably more than 20 percent of the disagreements to fall within this range.
Turning to the data, we find that 33 percent of the disagreements actually
occur here.
A greater-than-random number of disagreements between the two
sources should also occur in the nonscale traits that fall outside the area
bracketed around the cutoff line. That is, the further a society is from the
cutoff line, the less likely it should have nonscale elements (have a 0 where
1 should be, and vice versa). For any group of societies away from the
bracketed area, the chances are more likely that there are coding errors for
the nonscale elements than for the scale elements and, thus, for disagreement between the two sources. Away from the bracketed societies around
the cutoff line, the two sources disagree in 15 percent of the comparable
cases; but, for the nonscale elements in this set, the degree of disagreement is 23 percent, which, as predicted, is higher.
Thus, correct predictions about the distribution of error in all of the
tests can be made. Such results give us greater confidence in interpreting
the data and in carrying out the statistical testing of hypotheses ahead.
D. The EmpiricalTests
Most of the hypotheses can be validated by showing that the traits in
question are "cumulative," that is, that after the societies have been ranked
by level of economic development, the less advanced societies do not have
the specified trait which appears in the advanced societies (where "more"
and "less" advanced are determined by the cutoff line).
The statistical procedures used in carrying out this task are similar
to those used in table 5. The first step is to derive a "random" comparison
pattern, and here we follow exactly the same method as before. For example, let us suppose that we have a sample of 200 societies and that
forty of them have a particular trait (i.e., there are forty 1-values). Using
the Goodenough-Edwards technique, the cutoff line defines two areas
with, respectively, forty and 160 ratings; and a "random" comparison
table is then constructed exactly as table 4. With the data, we arrange the
societies according to the relative levels of economic development, draw a
cutoff line, compare the results with the results from the random pattern,
and finally calculate a X2to see if they differ to a significant extent.
A statistic very similar to the coefficient of reproducibility can also
be calculated for each trait which provides a useful summary measure.
The formula is: modified reproducibility coefficient equals unity minus the
ratio errors to the total number of societies in the sample.
The statistical test shows significant deviations from the random
pattern, but does not distinguish between those where sufficientconditions
are stated (where all of the societies above the cutoff line have the trait
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TABLE 6
RESULTS

Hypotheses

OF THE STATISTICAL

TESTS (CORNELL

TECHNI

Rank in
Coefficient
of
Percentages Development
Societies of Societies
Matrix of
Reproduciin Sample with Trait
Trait
C-Measure
bility

X2

Property Rights in Factors of Production
Al, A2, A3..

100

32

25

.84

.31

39.29

Al, A2, A3..

100

19

57-65

.90

.40

41.53

A4 .........

100

34

19

.83

.53

29.04

A5 .........

100

11

127-140

.95

.40

51.64

Transferof Property Rights
B1 .........

100

68

12

.79

.33

32.87

B2 .........
B2 .........

45
41

49
78

11
3

.78
.80

.20
.25

13.93
4.79
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Transferof PropertyRights (continued
B3 .........

100

24

47-50

.87

.23

38.22

B4 .........

100

27

27

.88

.42

46.45

B5 .........

100

22

38

.87

.46

36.51

Delineation of Property Rights
C1 .........

100

35

15

.88

.25

59.15

C2 .........

100

6

127-40

.98

.50

67.68

C3 .........

100

13

56-65

.98

.00

82.71

Generalized Property Rights: Money
DI .........
D2 .........
D3 .........
D4 .........

100
100
100
100

28
6
8
13

34
127-40
127-40
66-72

.83
.96
.94
.91

.47
.75
1.00
.56

31.23
41.65
29.85
31.92

* The X2statistics have 1 degree of freedom; a coefficientof 3.48 is significantat the .95
tering measure)is definedin the text. The "rank in development matrix of trait" shows the r
with which the relative levels of development were determined.(This was determined by com
of the trait in the development matrix with the same cutoff point.) The data for hypothesis B
EA76 traits); all the rest of the data comes from Carneiro.
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while none of those below the line do) and where necessary but not sufficient conditions occur (where some of the societies above the cutoff line
have the trait while none of those below do). Since the hypotheses are
stated in terms of necessary but not sufficient conditions, this is not
disturbing. The results of the X2tests as well as calculations of the coefficient or reproducibility and the percentage of societies with the given
trait are summarized in table 6 below.
The first three hypotheses concern the presence of slavery and, from
the table, it is clear that both intra- and extrasocietal slavery are cumulative
traits.
The first two hypotheses deal with the relative level of economic
development at which slavery appears; and the most direct evidence of this
is found in the rank order of traits composing the scale that are presented.
The key question is the relative position of the slavery traits in regard to
two crucial traits: "agriculture provides the major part of subsistence"
and "a surplus of food regularly produced over and above the annual
subsistence needs of the food producers and not consumed by them."
Both of these crucial traits are cumulative, and the former occurs at a
lower stage of economic development than the slavery traits.27 Therefore,
hypothesis Al about slavery occurring in agriculturalrather than hunting
and gathering societies is confirmed. Intrasocietal slavery also occurs
above the surplus point, although extratribal slavery does not. Thus,
hypothesis A2 about slavery occurring only in those societies well above
the subsistence level receives only partial confirmation. If extrasocietal
slaves are poorly fed and worked to death, then an implicit assumption of
the original hypothesis is changed, and the actual results can be
rationalized.
Hypothesis A3 about extrasocietal slavery preceding intrasocietal
slavery appears confirmed, because many more societies possess the former
trait and the cutoff line is at a much lower level of development for the
former than for the latter trait.
Hypothesis A4 concerns the existence of continuous-ownership
rights over improved land after a certain level of development and is
more easily validated. Here, the only important test is whether the trait is
cumulative, a factor which is demonstrated by the very high x2 statistic.
The final hypothesis of the group (A5)-that rental of land or dwellings
is a common form of tenure at high levels of economic development-is
similarly validated by the high X2 statistic. This proposition, in turn, is
based on the notion that at higher levels of economic development there
is greater economic inequality, a phenomenon for which indirect evidence
is available for only a small sample.28
27
These traits are, respectively, trait 11 and trait 36 in the rankings (Cornell
technique), where the lowest number signifies that the trait occurs at a lower level of
economic development. The X2 statistics are significant.
A5 is based on an argument concerning greater economic ine28 Hypothesis
quality at higher levels of economic development. Additional evidence on this matter

432

This content downloaded from 130.58.65.20 on Tue, 28 Apr 2015 19:56:01 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Frederic L. Pryor
Hypotheses B1, B2, and B3, all deal with inheritance regulations, and
in testing them several minor problems arise. Hypothesis BI states that,
after a certain level of development, property is transmitted by inheritance
rather than being destroyed at death. Such a trait turns out to be cumulative (according to the X2 test), and the hypothesis appears validated.
Hypothesis B2 deals with formal inheritance procedures for movable property preceding procedures for real property. Both of these types of inheritance arrangements appear cumulative, but several difficulties of
interpretation arise. First, the data for B2 come from a different source
than for hypothesis BI and show that inheritance regulations are introduced at a somewhat earlier stage on the developmental scale. Second, the
cumulative nature of inheritanceof movable property is just barely statistically significant and, if we use the Goodenough-Edwards technique
instead, falls slightly below the limit of significance. Nevertheless, it does
appear that inheritance rules governing movable property occurred at an
earlier developmental stage than for real property. And, combining the
information from the two hypotheses, the following pattern seems clear:
At the lowest levels of economic development, most individual property
is destroyed at the death of the owner. At higher development levels,
regulations for the inheritance of movable property appears; and, at a
somewhat higher development levels, rules for the inheritance of real
(land and structures) property exist. Such a pattern, in turn, offers strong
evidence for the notion that family ownership of real property precedes
individual ownership, which is a commonplace among anthropologists.
Hypothesis B3 concerns testamentary disposition of property and is
significantly related to the level of economic development. As predicted,
such a trait appears at a much higher level of economic development than
where rules of inheritance first appear. The appearance of escheat (hypothesis B4) and of the confiscation of property for punishment (hypothesis
B5) also are significantly related to the level of economic development and
are thus validated.
Three hypotheses are offered above that link particular ways in which
property rights are delineated with the level of economic development:
more specifically, the existence of continuous boundaries delimiting
agricultural fields (Cl), the formal inscription of land through a registry
of deeds (C2), and the private recorded inventories of wealth (C3) are
related to the relative level of economic development. Further, the first
trait should appear first in societies ranked according to development,
followed by the third, and then the second. The three hypotheses are
validated by the high X2 statistics (which show that they are cumulative
can be gained from Textor's FC137, which concerns the existence of invidious displays of wealth. For the thirty societies which overlap the sample of societies used in
this study, the trait appears to be cumulative, although there is a slight ambiguity.
Using the Goodenough-Edwards technique, the X2 is somewhat below the required
confidence limit; using the Cornell technique, the x2 is above this limit. Although a
larger sample would be desirable in order to study this trait more extensively, the
results do appear consistent with the hypothesis under examination.
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traits) and by the relative number of societies that have each trait (which
designate the relative points along the development scale at which the
traits appear).
The final group of hypotheses deal with the existence of general
property rights, particularly in relation to the occurrence of money. All
four traits are significantly cumulative, as shown by the high X2 statistic.
Hypothesis D 1, that the existence of a standardizedmedium of exchange is
related to the level of economic development, is thus validated. Hypothesis
D2, that coined money appears at a higher stage of development, is validated by the high X2 and the fact that many fewer societies possess this
trait than the former. Hypothesis D3, that at the same or higher developmental stage taxes are collected in money, is also confirmed: the trait is
cumulative and appears at roughly the same time as coined money.
Hypothesis D4 is that at some point along the development scale after
the appearance of a standardized medium of exchange, loans at interest
occur. Again, the evidence is positive.
The positive evidence for the seventeen hypotheses is impressive. The
cost/benefit technique permits a number of varied hypotheses about the
cumulative nature of certain economic traits to be generated for which
the empirical evidence appears strong. Certain problems arise, however,
in regard to the pattern of errors which deserves further attention. Such
difficulties can be seen most clearly if the hypotheses themselves are
strengthened.
As I emphasized, the hypotheses are stated in terms of "necessary
but not sufficient" conditions and, as such, remain relatively weak. Let us
add an additional assumption: groups of men in primitive and peasant
societies have a keen sense of their economic interests; and, if the economic
potential for a particular property institution exist, the force of these
interests leads to the establishment of the institution in question. We have
now changed the hypotheses so that development is a sufficient condition
for a property institution to appear. Further statistical tests are now
necessary.
As noted above, the X2test employed in this study relates the observed
pattern to a random pattern; and it should be clear that, the fewer the
errors, the more closely related the trait to the level of economic development. From table 6 the readercan see that the errors are generally few and
that the coefficients of reproducibilityand the x2 coefficients are generally
quite high. Examination of the pattern of errors now allows an interesting
test to be made: if the errors cluster around the cutoff line, then there is a
high probability that they are due to observational errors or small errors
in scaling; if the errors are randomly distributed, then other factors may
have to be taken into consideration before "sufficient" conditions for the
various property institutions can be established.
To examine these matters systematically, we can employ a technique
used in others parts of this paper to compare the percentage of errors
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within a zone around the cutoff line with the percentage that we would
expect from a random distribution of errors. For simplicity, the zone is
defined as 10 percent of the societies above and below the cutoff line;
therefore, we would expect 20 percent of the errors to fall within this zone.
In table 6 the C-measure (clustering measure) is the actual percentage of
errors falling within the defined zone, using the Cornell technique to
define the cutoff line (the Goodenough-Edwards technique yields similar
results).
In almost every case, more errors appear in the bracketed zone than
would appear if they were distributed randomly (i.e., the C-measure is
over .20 in all cases). In ten out of the seventeen traits that are examined,
the C-measure is .40 or higher; that is, the actual errors are two times or
more greater in number than expected within the zone. Thus, a large
proportion of the recorded "errors" are probably due to statistical mistakes rather than to the economic reality under examination.
Since the remaining errors are relatively few, several interpretations
are open to us. First, we could dismiss the remaining errors (i.e., the errors
outside the bracketed areas) as due to random factors that act to offset
the more basic economic forces in special circumstances. Second, we could
argue that such errors are consistent with the hypotheses stated with
necessary rather than sufficient conditions, but this approach implies a
particularpattern of errors, namely, that the "errors"outside the bracketed
area consist solely of traits not appearing in societies above the stage of
development embodying the necessary conditions for that trait. Unfortunately, the pattern of errors does not appear like this but rather is
roughly equally distributed on either side of the bracketed area. Third, we
might argue that the economic-development factors play a very important
but not a completely exclusive role in the appearanceof particularproperty
rights and institutions and that we cannot be completely sure of the critical
mechanisms until alternative hypotheses to explain the same general
phenomena are tested. I waver between the first and third interpretations,
depending upon my state of modesty at the time, and must leave this issue
to the reader.
Interpretation of my results requires a brief discussion of one last
major question: to what extent can one use these cross-section results to
generalize about the development of property rights and institutions over
time ? Since most of the relevant issues of this controversy have been often
discussed in both the economic and anthropology literature, my comments
can be brief.
In regard to my scale of economic development, it should be clear that
because of the possibilities of diffusion, it is possible that some of the traits
would be in a somewhat different order on the development scale if timeseries data were analyzed in a similar way. For example, because of
contact with Europeans, use of certain technologies might appear now in
much less economically developed societies than in the past, where such
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technologies had to be invented by members of the society itself. Nevertheless, such changes in the ranking of traits and, perhaps, of several tribes
should not deflect attention from the basic idea that, at a single point in
time or over time, complexity is a unidimensional phenomenon that can
be scaled.29 Further, this does not imply that a society cannot retrogress
economically, but rather that, if it does retrogress,there is a certain pattern
that can be predicted.30
For the property institutions examined in this study, three questions
can be asked: Would they scale with time-series data ? Would they appear
at the same point on the scale? And would they appear in the same
order?
The theoretical justifications of the various hypotheses suggests that
they would scale, an assertion for which there is also a certain amount of
positive empirical evidence to support.31We would not expect cutoff lines
of the property institutions to be at exactly the same point on the development scale as in the cross-section study. But, for those institutions in
which relative ranks with other traits (e.g., intrasocietal slavery institutions
appearing after societies are above a bare subsistence level) or relative
ranks with other property institutions (e.g., inheritance of personal
property preceding inheritance of real property) are important, we would
expect that the same relative ranks would obtain because of the theoretical
justifications offered in the previous section.
E. Summary and Conclusions
In this essay, I have examined seventeen hypotheses about the relationship of property rights and institutions to economic development which
were derived from a roughjudgment about the economic costs and benefits
involved in each. By examining the existence of such institutions in 100
primitive societies that have been ranked according to their relative levels
of economic development, positive evidence of the hypotheses appeared
in every case. Although the hypotheses were stated in terms of necessary
conditions, with an additional hypothesis about the great importance of the
role of economic interests in primitive societies, the stated conditions
become sufficient for the existence of the property institution under
examination. Certain additional evidence for this matter is adduced from
the data as well. Three general conclusions can be drawn from such an
exercise:
First, for some economic institution, it is not necessary to take into
account the social matrixof an economy in orderto predict their occurrence.
That is, considerations of the level of economic development appear to
29

Empirical evidence on this matter is presented by Carneiro, "Ascertaining,
Testing, and Interpreting Sequences of Cultural Development" (n. 16 above).
30 This is not to deny that some type of hysteresis effect might be present but,
rather, that if a society retrogresses, there is a great probability that those traits that
are highest on the trait list will be lost first.
31 Carneiro, "Ascertaining,
Testing, and Interpreting" (n. 16 above).
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transcend particular cultural, social, or political considerations that might
lead the investigator to make a more complicated theoretical analysis than
necessary.
Second, the scalogram technique, which I have used to rank the
societies according to their relative level of economic development, is an
analytical tool which can be of considerable use to economists. Since it
allows quantification of qualitative data, it can be used, not only in
analyzing institutions (as I have employed it), but also in many other cases
where one may wish to scale attitudes, or patterns of activities, or properties where metric devices cannot be directly applied.
Finally, by taking account of some very simple cost/benefit considerations, it is possible to make accurate predictions about relationships
between economic development and property institutions. Since property
rights and institutions structure the pattern of decision making which
influences economic activity, we can analyze at least one facet of a subject
that has been too long neglected by economists. A general positive theory
of property lies far in the future. But, since we may be reaching the point
of diminishing returns from multiequational descriptions of economies, it
might be useful to begin a more systematic analysis of the economic
institutions that underlie the dry equations.
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